Abstract: International business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public o¢cials by foreign …rms. We …rst analyze a convention styled after the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢cials in International Business Transactions" that requires signatory countries to proceed against …rms that have bribed public o¢cials of any foreign country. We then study the case in which the convention requires signatory countries to proceed against …rms that have bribed public o¢cials of signatory countries only. We argue that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure enforcement of penalties.
Introduction
Market participation of foreign …rms is commonly believed to promote competition and e¢-ciency. But international business transactions pose the problem of e¤ectively deterring bribing of public o¢cials by foreign …rms. Many corrupt transactions involve companies that are incorporated in di¤erent countries and that take advantage of the disparities among national legal systems and of the limited ability to enforce national judicial rulings with foreign nationals and companies. Most countries do not prosecute domestic …rms or their executives when they are found to have bribed foreign public o¢cials. Some countries regard bribes paid to foreign o¢cials as necessary business expenses to produce taxable income and therefore consider them tax deductible.
In the past few years several international organizations, including the WTO, the UN, the Council of Europe, and the OECD, have recognized the importance of this reality and have started projects that aim to provide an e¤ective supranational framework to …ght corruption. As an example, the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢cials in International Business Transactions" is an attempt to induce individual countries to regard corruption of foreign public o¢cial in the same terms as corruption of domestic public o¢cials. A country that signs the Convention commits to prosecuting its …rms found to have bribed foreign public o¢cials as if they had bribed a local public o¢cial.
The OECD Convention entered into force in February 1999. For the Convention to enter into force it was required that it be approved by 5 of the 10 countries with the largest shares of OECD exports, representing at least 60% of the combined total exports of those 10 countries. By september 2001, 28 OECD member countries and 5 non-member countries had approved the Convention. Under OECD auspices, a process of multilateral surveillance began in April 1999, with the purpose of monitoring compliance with the Convention and assessing the steps taken by countries to implement it in national law. 1 After initial euphoria caused by the OECD Convention's generalized approval and public praise, mounting evidence of lack of enforcement has generated a more dismal view in the …nancial and business press. "When OECD member countries signed a convention in 1997 outlawing bribery by multinational companies of o¢cials abroad, it was regarded as a milestone in the global …ght against corruption. But …ve years later the convention is in crisis. It has produced no prosecutions [ 3 This paper is an attempt to provide an initial analysis of corruption in international business transactions by studying the extent to which di¤erent international arrangements are likely to make anti-corruption legislations enforced beyond national borders. In particular, we ask how likely the OECD Convention is to succeed in its goal and whether a di¤erent institutional arrangement may lead to superior results.
We consider a multi-country model of procurement. Each country procures one unit of a good and the procurement process is managed by a public o¢cial. Firms active in a country may attempt to bribe the public o¢cial in order to be awarded the procurement contract. Individual countries simultaneously set the penalties that are imposed on domestic …rms that operate in the same country and on domestic …rms operating abroad. After that, each country sets the monitoring intensity that determines the probability with which a corrupt transaction is discovered. When a corrupt transaction is discovered, a penalty is imposed on the bribing …rm. When the …rm discovered to have bribed the public o¢cial is a local …rm, the government has the ability to enforce the penalty . But if the …rm is foreign, the penalty is not enforced unless the …rm's home country "cooperates" with the judicial system of the country where the illegal transaction took place. After countries have publicly set penalties and monitoring technologies, …rms o¤er bribes in a probabilistic auction. As a result, the contract available in any one country is awarded to one …rm that operates in that country with a probability that depends on the bribe it o¤ered. In this situation, we …nd, unsurprisingly, that because enforcing penalties is costly, it is a dominant strategy for each individual country not to impose any penalties on domestic …rms bribing foreign public o¢cials.
We then examine whether international cooperation is more likely to arise when a convention similar to the OECD Convention is proposed and when individual countries have to simultaneously decide whether to adhere to the Convention before setting penalties and monitoring probabilities. We make use of a simple model in which countries that sign the Convention have the ability of committing to enforce it. The discussion of the recent evidence on the OECD Convention clari…es that a country that signs a convention may in the end choose not to enforce it. This in turn implies that the meaningful decision is not whether to sign the Convention or not, but rather whether to enforce it or not. Our paper is concerned with the second decision, but for ease of exposition, we make reference to a situation in which countries decide to sign the convention but have the ability to commit to enforcing it.
We …nd that a convention styled after the OECD Convention may generate some degree of international cooperation and that multiple and Pareto ranked equilibria exist. Our analysis centers in particular on the impact of the clause that requires a minimum number of signatory countries for the Convention to enter into force. We show that this minimum threshold may be bene…cial, because it can rule out high corruption equilibria, but may also be detrimental because, if it is set too high, it may leave only one equilibrium in which no country signs the convention.
We …nally consider an alternative convention that stipulates that signatory countries commit to enforcing penalties on domestic …rms which are found to have bribed the public o¢cial of signatory countries only. We …nd that this kind of convention accomplishes two objectives. First, it provides additional incentives to sign the convention because the bene…ts of the convention are enjoyed only by the countries that sign it. Second, it reduces the enforcement costs that derive from signing the convention when few countries sign it. This reduces the incentives not to sign the convention when few countries are expected to sign and therefore makes the emergence of equilibria with a reduced number of signatory countries less likely. We argue that these e¤ects make the reciprocal convention a more appealing institutional framework than the OECD convention.
The growing international nature of corruption is an aspect that has largely been ignored by the economic profession until recently. Davis (2002) analyzes the incentives of payor countries (i.e., countries where bribing companies are incorporated) to unilaterally proceed against their …rms found to have bribed foreign public o¢cials. Because of its focus on corruption in procurement, our paper is related to the existing literature on corruption in procurement and in particular to the works on the optimal response of procurement mechanisms to corruption, such as La¤ont and Tirole (1991), La¤ont and N'Guessan (1999) or Celentani and Ganuza (2002).
The Model
Consider N sovereign countries and N 2 …rms. Firm (i; j) is incorporated in country i and operates in country j, i = 1; : : : ; N, j = 1; : : : ; N. This means that N …rms operate in each country, one locally incorporated and N ¡1 foreign, and that each country has N …rms, one that operates in the country and N ¡1 abroad. 4 We choose to consider the case of N countries, because the case with 2 countries is a special one in which an important e¤ect that will be discussed later is absent. The government of each country has to procure a good that can be produced at di¤erent quality levels. For simplicity, we assume there are only two levels of quality, low and high. When quality is low, the government's valuation of the good is V and when it is high it is V > V . Given that the government of country i makes decisions on behalf of country i, in the rest of the paper we will use the two terms interchangeably.
The good to be procured by each government is purchased from any one of the N …rms that operate in the country. All …rms are commonly known to have the same production costs. We denote by K and K the cost of producing low and high quality, respectively, with 0 · K < K. For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the paper we assume that it is pro…table for governments to procure the good at the high quality level in all equilibria. Notice that a necessary condition for this to happen is that it is e¢cient to procure high quality, i.e., V ¡ V > K ¡ K.
Each government delegates the execution of the procurement process to a public o¢cial who is able to verify that the good is of high quality prior to making the payment to the supplying …rm. Firms are risk-neutral and maximize expected pro…ts. Given that all …rms are commonly known to have the same cost, we assume that the public o¢cial randomly selects a …rm operating in the country and awards it a procurement contract that requires high quality and that promises a payment of K if the high quality good is supplied.
Any …rm can bribe the public o¢cial to be awarded the project and be illegally allowed to supply low quality, an event we refer to as corruption. We assume that a corrupt transaction is the result of the following probabilistic auction. Each …rm in a given country sets a nonnegative bribe. If …rm (i; j) (incorporated in country i and operating in country j) sets bribe¯i j¸0 it will win the auction (it will succeed in corrupting the public o¢cial of country j) with probability°i
where B > 0 is an exogenous parameter that measures public o¢cials' propensity to corruption.
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A …rm (i; j) is required to pay the bribe it o¤ered,¯i j , only if it wins the auction (only if it succeeds in corrupting the public o¢cial of country j), i.e., only with probability¯i j =B. Under this probabilistic auction a …rm that bids a higher bribe has a higher probability of corrupting the public o¢cial, but this probability is less than 1. Our way of modeling corruption is similar to the way in which rent seeking is often modeled, but two di¤erences exist. First, we assume that the bribe bid by each individual …rm is a promise of payment if it is awarded the contract and that no outlay is required of …rms that have not been awarded the contract. This contrasts with the literature on rent seeking that assumes that rent seekers' expenditures are unconditional, so that also losing rent seekers bear the cost of participating in the contest. Second, we assume that the probability of corruption is less than 1 and we are especially interested in determining what causes this probability to be higher or lower. By contrast, the literature on rent seeking normally assumes that the rent is assigned with probability 1 and that an individual bidder's expenditure only has an impact on its own probability of being awarded the rent, but not on the overall probability of the rent being assigned. For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we will assume that all equilibria are interior, so that in particular¯i j¸0 for all (i; j)
Notice that (3) implies that in all equilibria there is probability at least 1 ¡¯> 0 that no corruption takes place. This is important, because the assumption that the government requires high quality is justi…ed only if this probability is positive and su¢ciently high. When …rm (i; j) bribes the public o¢cial of country j, they are discovered with probability ¹ j 2 [0; 1] which is determined by the government of country j. We assume that if …rm (i; j) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country j, it receives a nonmonetary penalty ¼ ij which is determined by the government of country i, the country where the …rm is incorporated. This assumption is meant to recognize that each country has very limited ability to enforce penalties on …rms incorporated in foreign countries, unless these foreign countries cooperate. We assume that only two possible levels for penalties exist, ¼ ij 2 f0; ¼g with ¼ ij = ¼ > 0 meaning that …rm (i; j) is penalized by country i and ¼ ij = 0 meaning that …rm (i; j) is not penalized by country i. Our description should be regarded as a stylized representation of a situation in which enforcement of penalties against foreign …rms and their executives is less e¤ective than enforcement of a penalty against a domestic …rm and its executives. The assumption that without cooperation of the country where the …rm is incorporated the penalty is 0 is without loss of generality. Our qualitative results would be the same with nonzero but lower e¤ective deterrence for foreign …rm.
We assume that if a country chooses monitoring probability ¹, it bears cost
where M > 0 is an exogenous parameter. We also assume that if country i prosecutes …rm (i; j) (when this is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country j) it bears a cost equal to P > 0. Let
and let°i
denote the probability of corruption in country i. The government of country i is risk neutral and has preferences represented by the following utility function
The …rst two terms refer to the expected net utility of procuring the good. With probability 1¡°i there is no corruption. In this case the good is of high quality, it is worth V to the government, and the payment to the supplier is K. With probability°i there is corruption. In this case the good is of low quality, it is worth V to the government and the payment to the supplier is K. The third term represents the cost to government i of setting a monitoring probability equal to ¹ i . The last term represents the cost to the government of country i of prosecuting domestic …rms that operate in the country or abroad. The cost of prosecuting …rm (i; j) (i.e., setting ¼ ij = ¼) is P multiplied by the probability that …rm (i; j) is involved in a corrupt transaction which is uncovered in country j,°i j ¹ j . Notice that we ignore the cost of prosecuting (successfully or unsuccessfully) foreign …rms that operate in the country, because these costs are likely to be considerable but are inessential for the purposes of the paper. 6 In the following we will …nd it useful to view the payo¤s to the government of any one country as the bene…ts of procurement, BP i (°),
minus the monitoring cost, MC i (¹; ¼;°), de…ned above, minus the enforcement cost, EC i (¹; ¼;°),
Summarizing we can express the utility function of the government of country i as:
The preferences of …rm (i; j) are represented by the following utility function
In words, if …rm (i; j) is not involved in a corrupt transaction, it makes zero pro…t. If it is, an event which happens with probability°i j =¯i j B , it makes an extra pro…t equal to
, it pays out bribe¯i j to the public o¢cial of country j, and it su¤ers an expected penalty equal to
We summarize the extensive form of the game through the following time sequence:
The governments of all countries announce contests to procure high quality goods and publicly set penalties for corruption.
² Stage 2 (monitoring probabilities): The governments of all countries observe
and choose monitoring probabilities. Government i sets ¹ i .
² Stage 3 (bribe bidding): Firms (i; j), i = 1; : : : ; N, j = 1; : : : ; N, observe
and choose¯i j¸0 .
² Stage 4 (outcomes and payo¤s):
In each country i = 1; : : : ; N the public o¢cial is bribed by …rm (i; j) with probability°i j =¯i j B , j = 1; : : : ; N. In this case …rm (i; j) is awarded the procurement project, produces a low quality good, is reimbursed for the high quality good, and pays out bribe¯i j to the public o¢cial. With probability ¹ i the corrupt agreement is uncovered and penalty ¼ ij is imposed on the …rm. With probability 1 ¡°i the public o¢cial of country i is not bribed by any …rm. In this case, the public o¢cial randomly awards the project to any …rm (i; j), j = 1; : : : ; N. Firm (i; j) produces a high quality good and is reimbursed its cost.
We denote by ¡ the game de…ned by the previous extensive form. For the sake of simplicity in the following we will focus on parameter constellations such that SPNE outcomes are all interior, i.e., ¹ i 2 (0; 1),°i j 2 (0; 1),°i 2 (0; 1), for all i and all j. Notice that this is always the case provided that B is su¢ciently high and that P is not too high,
We now want to justify the way in which we model corruption and in particular the choice of endogenizing corruption probabilities through the probabilistic auction described above. First, note that our main goal is to study how di¤erent deterrence mechanisms endow private parties with di¤erent incentives to engage in corrupt transactions. Recall that the probabilistic auction we propose implies that …rms which o¤er higher bribes have a higher probability of corrupting the public o¢cial, but that any …rm that bids a positive bribe has a positive probability of corrupting the public o¢cial. Given that …rms with higher expected gains from corruption …nd it optimal to o¤er higher bribes, the probabilistic auction 1. Takes into account that …rms with higher incentives to engage in corrupt transactions are more likely to corrupt a public o¢cial.
2. Recognizes that any …rm with a positive expected gain from corruption has a positive probability of succeeding in corrupting the public o¢cial.
Property 1 seems uncontroversial in that it conveys the idea that corruptors' willingness to pay is important. Property 2 states that the public o¢cial may strike a deal with a …rm that is not the one willing to pay the highest bribe. We believe that property 2 is appealing for the following reason. Corrupt arrangements are illegal and therefore face signi…cant and varying transaction costs arising from asymmetric information and the absence of legal commitments. This may ultimately lead to a corrupt transaction with a …rm di¤erent from the one that can generate the highest surplus and is therefore willing to pay the highest bribe. For example, existing communication networks and established reputations may reduce transaction costs with some selected …rms and may make an agreement with these …rms more likely, regardless of their expected gains from corruption.
The probabilistic auction should be regarded as a reduced form that describes how di¤erent incentives to engage in corrupt transactions translate into corruption probabilities. We believe that resorting to a reduced form model is appropriate, because corruption can be organized in a wide variety of di¤erent ways, and any detailed description of the process that leads to a corrupt agreement is bound to be incomplete and may lead to unreasonable predictions. 7 Before concluding it is also important to underline that our probabilistic auction implies that the probability of any one …rm succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial depends only on the bribe it promises and on B, the propensity of the public o¢cial to become corrupt (see equation (1)). In other words the probability of a …rm succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial is independent of the bribes which are promised by the other …rms. 8 This simpli…es the analysis because …rms have dominant strategies in the bribe setting game of stage 3. But it is also useful to underline that the results of the paper would be unchanged in a more general environment in which the probability of a …rm bribing the public o¢cial also depends on the bribes of competing …rms. For example, we have veri…ed that all our results hold when°i
with l 2 [0; 1) and°i j 2 [0; 1]; notice that (1) is a special case of (6) in which l = 0. With this speci…cation, which is reminiscent of models of yardstick competition, if …rm (i; j) chooses a bribe that gives it a positive probability of succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial of country j, this probability is increasing in its own bribe and increasing in the di¤erence between its own bribe and the average bribe. This implies that the probability of succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial is decreasing in the bribes bid by competing …rms. 9 3 The Basic Game: Free Riding This section studies subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of ¡. We start by analyzing individual …rms' play at stage 3.
: : : ; N , j = 1; : : : ; N
Proof. Appendix. Lemma 1 states that each …rm (i; j) bids a bribe that is proportional to the value of the corrupt agreement minus its expected penalty. From Lemma 1, the probability that the …rm (i; j) reaches a corrupt agreement with the public o¢cial of country j is°i
and the probability of corruption taking place in country j is°j 7 As mentioned above, the literature on rent seeking also views the allocation of rents as deriving from contest success functions that have desirable properties such as that the probability of a rent seeker being assigned the rent is higher when he expends more resources in the contest. 8 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the importance of justifying this assumption. 9 Appendix B analyzes the bribing game in which the probability of succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial is as in (6) .
We now turn to the monitoring probabilities set by governments in stage 2. Let
denote the sum of penalties imposed by foreign governments on the respective foreign …rms operating in country i.
Lemma 2 In a SPNE of ¡
Proof. Appendix. Lemma 2 shows that in stage 2, the monitoring intensity chosen by the government of country i is increasing in V ¡ V , the value of deterring corruption, increasing in ¼ Fi the sum of the penalties faced by the foreign …rms operating in the country, and decreasing in K ¡ K, the value of a corrupt agreement to the corrupt parties.
The following Proposition characterizes the path of the SPNE of ¡.
Proposition 1 In the path of the unique SPNE of ¡, for i = 1; : : : ; N
Proposition 1 states that in a SPNE of ¡ the government of each country i sets a positive penalty on …rm (i; i), the domestically incorporated …rm that operates in the country, ¼ ¤ ii = ¼ > 0. The government of country i …nds this optimal because a positive penalty on …rm (i; i) decreases the probability that the …rm bribes the public o¢cial and therefore decreases the total probability that the local public o¢cial is involved in a corrupt transaction. On the other hand, given that imposing a penalty on …rm (i; j), j 6 = i, is costly to the government of country i but bene…cial only for country j, no government imposes penalties on domestically incorporated …rms that operate abroad, i.e., for all i = 1; : : : ; N, ¼ ij = 0, 8j 6 = i. Given that a positive penalty on …rm (i; i) makes monitoring valuable, in a SPNE the government of each country i sets a positive monitoring probability that is such that the marginal value of deterring corruption of …rm (i; i) is equal to the marginal cost of monitoring.
From Proposition 1, the probability that a public o¢cial is bribed by an arbitrary foreign …rm is higher than the probability that he is bribed by the domestic …rm,°i j >°i i , because foreign …rms face lower expected penalties and therefore …nd it optimal to o¤er higher bribes. This implies that in the stylized setting described in this paper an easy if partial remedy against corruption would be to require that the procurement contract always be awarded to the domestic …rm. This result is an arti…cial consequence of some simplifying assumptions we make and in particular:
1. Firms do not have private information about their costs or other possibly relevant parameters, such as their quality. This implies that competition plays no role in achieving e¢ciency and in reducing the expected procurement cost.
2. A bribe of a given amount is equally likely to succeed in bribing the public o¢cial regardless of whether it is o¤ered by a domestic or a foreign …rm. This implies that we do not recognize that local …rms are normally more e¤ective in establishing the connections with public o¢cials and we therefore underestimate the probability that they are involved in a corrupt transaction. 10 In other words, we share the common views that participation of foreign …rms promotes competition and leads to e¢ciency gains and that, ceteris paribus, domestic …rms are more likely to succeed in bribing the public o¢cial. For these reasons we believe that it is desirable to allow foreign bidders to participate in competitive procurement mechanisms. But to retain the analysis tractable, rather than proposing a model in which it is optimal to allow foreign …rms to participate, we simply assume that they are allowed, even if they are subject to a less e¤ective penalty scheme. 11 The focus of our paper is on how to rein in foreign …rms' propensities to bribe public o¢cials.
The Impact of Conventions on International Bribery
The previous section serves to make the point that it is costly for the government of country i to impose penalties on its …rms that operate abroad and that the bene…cial e¤ects deriving from corruption deterrence are enjoyed only by foreign countries. As a consequence no such penalties are imposed in equilibrium.
This section studies international conventions designed to deter international corruption by requiring countries to impose penalties on their …rms operating abroad. Before turning to this analysis we …rst wish to study the consequences of setting penalties on …rms operating abroad.
Corollary 1 Consider a subgame of ¡ starting at stage 2. In a SPNE of this subgame
Proof. Appendix. Corollary 1 states that when ¼ F i , the sum of the penalties faced by foreign …rms in country i, is higher, the government of country i …nds it optimal to increase the monitoring intensity, because the larger penalties increase marginal deterrence and therefore make monitoring more valuable at the margin. Corollary 1 also states that an increase in ¼ Fi leads to a reduction in corruption in country i. This deterrence arises for two reasons. First, increasing penalties has a direct e¤ect because it makes bribing more costly in expected terms. Second, larger penalties lead to higher monitoring intensities, and this reinforces the increase in the expected penalty. Finally, Corollary 1 states that if the government of a country j imposes penalties on its …rm operating in country i 6 = j it creates positive externalities on country i.
In the following we introduce a class of conventions inspired by the OECD "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢cials in International Business Transactions" Definition 1 Convention U (¿), ¿ = 1; : : : ; N : If a country signs the Convention and the Convention enters into force, the country commits to imposing the same penalty on all domestically incorporated …rms found to have bribed a public o¢cial regardless of the country where the public o¢cial is based. The Convention enters into force only if the number of signatory countries is greater than or equal to the threshold ¿.
Note that we denote this type of Convention by U (¿) to underline that the Convention is unilateral in the sense that a signatory country commits to prosecuting its …rms bribing public o¢cials of any foreign country, regardless of whether these countries reciprocate or not. As in the OECD Convention, under this kind of Convention, countries are allowed to choose their monitoring e¤orts, but they are required to enforce uniform penalties on domestic …rms that have been found to have bribed public o¢cials of any country. In other words, signatory countries commit to equating penalties for bribing domestic and foreign public o¢cials. Focusing on this type of conventions implicitly recognizes that it may be very di¢cult to verify monitoring e¤orts, but that it is easier to verify whether countries enforce penalties on domestic …rms that are found to have bribed foreign public o¢cials.
In the following we will focus on the game in which individual countries, before setting penalties and monitoring probabilities, decide whether to sign a given convention C = U (¿), ¿ = 1; : : : ; N, that constrains their subsequent choices.
Definition 2 Let ¡ (C) be the game in which the government of individual countries simultaneously decide at stage 0 whether to sign Convention C and then play as in ¡, with the possible restrictions that having signed Convention C may entail. Preferences for all players are inherited from ¡.
Notice that in ¡ (C) Convention C is given. This means that countries cannot propose or agree on a convention di¤erent from C, but can only decide at stage 0 whether they sign Convention C or not. We focus on this game because we are interested in analyzing individual countries' reactions to given conventions, rather than predicting what conventions are likely to be proposed. In other words the prime objective of this paper is a normative rather than a positive analysis.
To analyze the SPNE of ¡ (C) we proceed backward and start from …rms' bidding strategies in stage 3. Note that in a SPNE of ¡ (C) the bribe o¤ered by any one …rm depends on whether a convention is in force or not only because the convention may have an impact on the penalties and the monitoring probabilities set by governments in stages 1 and 2. In other words …rms' SPNE bidding strategies in stage 3 of ¡ (C) are identical to the SPNE bidding strategies in ¡ and are therefore characterized by Lemma 1.
A similar argument applies to monitoring probabilities set by individual countries in stage 2 of ¡ (C), and SPNE monitoring probabilities are therefore still characterized by Lemma 2. Notice in particular that, because by Lemma 2 a country's monitoring probability depends only on the sum of the penalties on the …rms active in the country, when a convention is in force all signatory countries will choose the same monitoring probability and all nonsignatory countries will choose a higher one. To see this, notice that if n countries sign Convention U (¿) and the Convention enters into force (i.e., n¸¿), a non-signatory country faces n signatory countries, but a signatory country only n ¡ 1. It is important to remark that while nonsignatory countries have higher monitoring probabilities, the monitoring probability of a given country does not depend on whether the country signs the Convention or not. In other words, if a nonsignatory country decides to deviate and sign the Convention, its monitoring probability is una¤ected whereas the monitoring probabilities of all other countries increase.
Under a Convention U (¿), stage 1 SPNE strategies are very easily characterized. When at least ¿ countries sign the Convention in stage 0, in stage 1 signatory countries set positive penalties for all their …rms, regardless of whether they operate in the home country or abroad, and each nonsignatory country sets a positive penalty only for the domestic …rm that operates in the country. When less than ¿ countries sign the Convention at stage 0, each country sets a positive penalty only for the domestic …rm that operates in the country.
In the next Proposition we make use of the previous results and move to the characterization of SPNE strategies in stage 0. Rather than presenting the results for Conventions U (¿), ¿ = 1; : : : ; N, we focus our attention on Convention U (N) in particular, because it has a special interest for our analysis. For the sake of completeness we will brie ‡y summarize the results for Conventions U (¿), ¿ = 1; : : : ; N ¡ 1 at the end of the present section.
Proposition 2 In ¡ (U (N )) there is a unique SPNE in which all N countries sign the Convention.
Proof. Appendix.
Proposition 2 clari…es that when ¿ = N each country becomes pivotal to the Convention entering into force. This implies that when considering a possible deviation from a pro…le in which all N countries sign Convention U (N), each country compares the situation in which all countries penalize their …rms abroad with one in which none does. Given the symmetry in the model, the assumption that guarantees that each country sets a positive penalty for the domestic …rm that operates in the country also ensures that the bene…t deriving from a Convention undersigned by all N countries is at least as large as the enforcement cost that each country has to bear for signing it. Therefore, a unilateral deviation from the pro…le in which all N countries sign the Convention is not pro…table.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that a unilateral Convention that enters into force only if all N countries sign it, will lead to all countries signing the Convention and therefore to the Convention entering into force. In this sense Proposition 2 suggests that there is an easy solution to the problem of international corruption. In the rest of this section we argue that this interpretation is overly optimistic because the result of Proposition 2 is not robust.
Proposition 2 may be regarded as making two separate statements:
1. Convention U (N) makes each country pivotal and therefore endows individual countries with incentives to sign.
2. Because all countries have incentives to sign the Convention, the Convention enters into force.
Suppose that the payo¤s of individual countries are not exactly as speci…ed in the model, but that each individual country may have an idiosyncratic disposition to sign the Convention. A country inclined to sign derives an excess payo¤ from signing that is larger than the excess bene…ts of procurement, minus the excess monitoring cost, minus the excess enforcement cost. A country inclined not to sign derives an excess payo¤ from signing that is lower than the excess bene…ts of procurement, minus the excess monitoring cost, minus the excess enforcement cost.
Introducing these idiosyncratic e¤ects seems reasonable for several reasons. First, our simple model does not take into account asymmetries that may endow di¤erent countries with di¤erent incentives to sign. Second, the model does not acknowledge either the fact that the governments of some countries are involved in corrupt transaction and are therefore all but keen to witness the failure of any attempt to curb international corruption. Finally, the model also ignores the fact that governments that commit to penalizing bribery of foreign public o¢cials may receive a bene…t for a variety of reasons that range from pure altruism to gains deriving from signaling its resolve to …ght corruption, and from an improved international status to more generous access to loans from the World Bank or the IMF.
When these idiosyncratic e¤ects are recognized, Convention U (N) still maximizes the incentives of individual countries to sign, but it provides no guarantee that all countries will end up signing and, therefore, that the Convention will enter into force. In other words, we are persuaded by Proposition 2's contention that making each country pivotal creates some incentives to sign. But we believe that its prediction that all countries will sign is not robust. For this reason, the rest of the paper is dedicated to an analysis of the impact of conventions on international corruption when individual countries have idiosyncratic propensities to sign a convention.
Before turning to an explicit analysis of the consequences of idiosyncratic payo¤ functions, we want to give a brief discussion of the extension of the result of Proposition 2 to Conventions U (¿), ¿ = 1; : : : ; N ¡ 1. In a SPNE under Convention U (¿), ¿ = 1; : : : ; N ¡ 1, no more than ¿ countries will sign the Convention. In particular, if ¿ is high enough in all SPNE of ¡ (U (¿)) exactly ¿ countries sign the Convention. This is the case because each of the ¿ signatory countries is pivotal to the Convention entering into force and because with a high ¿ a signatory country's bene…ts of procurement deriving from the fact that ¿ ¡ 1 foreign countries penalize their …rms operating abroad are su¢cient to compensate the increase in the enforcement costs that the signatory country bears for signing the Convention. When ¿ is low, in all SPNE of ¡ (U (¿)) exactly ¿ ¡ 1 countries sign the Convention. This is the case because each of the N ¡ ¿ + 1 nonsignatory countries is pivotal to the Convention not entering into force and …nds it optimal not to deviate and sign because with a low ¿ the bene…ts of procurement deriving from the fact that ¿ ¡ 1 foreign countries penalize their …rms operating abroad are not su¢cient to compensate the increase in the enforcement costs that signing the Convention and causing it enter into force would entail.
The previous discussion illustrates that in a simple game such as ¡ (U (¿)) there are obvious gains in making ¿ as high as possible. This is the reason we chose to focus our analysis on U (N). The goal of the rest of the paper is to show that the introduction of idiosyncratic components in the inclination to sign a convention leads to dramatic changes.
Unilateral Conventions and Idiosyncratic Preferences
In this section we allow the preferences of countries to di¤er from G i (¹; ¼;°). Let ¾ i 2 fY; N g denote the action of signing (¾ i = Y ) or not (¾ i = N) the Convention for country i at stage 0.
Definition 3 Let ¡ (®; C) be the game in which Nature publicly draws ® = (® 1 ; : : : ; ® N ) 2 R N at stage ¡1, the governments of individual countries simultaneously decide at stage 0 whether to sign Convention C and then play as in ¡, with the possible restrictions that having signed Convention C may entail. Preferences for …rms are inherited from ¡. Governments' preferences are represented by:
Notice that, as in ¡ (C), in ¡ (®; C) Convention C is given. This means that countries cannot propose di¤erent conventions but can only decide whether to sign Convention C at stage 0 of the game. In game ¡ (®; C), the act of signing the Convention gives each individual government i an additive and idiosyncratic extra utility of ® i 2 R that does not depend on whether other countries have signed or not the Convention and in particular on whether the Convention enters into force or not. Notice that ® i can be positive, negative, or zero. Without loss of generality we index countries so that ® 1¸®2¸: : :¸® N .
We now want to discuss some preliminary results that will be useful for the characterization of the SPNE of ¡ (®; C). In particular we are interested in analyzing the impact of the decision to sign a Convention on the enforcement costs borne by a signatory country. To do this we need to analyze the changes in the continuation play and continuation utilities that may derive from an individual country's deviation from a given stage 0 action pro…le.
Consider a subgame starting at stage 1 after a total of n¸¿ countries have signed Convention U (¿) at stage 0. In a SPNE of this subgame signatory countries set penalties for all their …rms and nonsignatory countries set penalties only for their …rms operating domestically. Consider now stage 2 and denote by ¹ S¤ and ¹ NS¤ the SPNE monitoring probabilities in a signatory and nonsignatory country, respectively. Similarly, let°S ¤ ¡i and°N S¤ ¡i denote the SPNE probability that a …rm incorporated in country i is involved in a corrupt transaction in a foreign signatory or nonsignatory country, respectively.
The following Lemma characterizes the reduction in enforcement costs that a signatory country i could achieve by deviating and not signing the Convention.
Lemma 3 Consider ¡ (®; U (¿)) and an action pro…le at stage 0 in which n¸¿ countries (including country i) sign Convention U (¿). The reduction in enforcement costs that country i could achieve by deviating and not signing the Convention is
Proof. Immediate. The enforcement costs deriving from signing Convention U (¿) depend on the number of signatory countries, n, because signing the Convention implies an enforcement cost for country i that depends on the expected number of corruption cases that are uncovered. Given that this expected number is equal to the probability of corruption times the monitoring probability, it depends on the number of signatory countries, as the latter a¤ects both probabilities of corruption and monitoring probabilities. DEC i (n) in Lemma 3 describes the magnitude of enforcement cost savings government i would attain by deviating from a pro…le in which it signs Convention U (¿) together with n ¡ 1 other countries. Notice that the enforcement cost savings depend on the number of the other countries that penalize bribing of foreign public o¢cials. However, they depend on the speci…c Convention only to the extent that they are di¤erent from 0 so long as n¸¿; but are otherwise independent of ¿.
Consider now a pro…le with n > ¿ signatory countries. For that to be part of a SPNE of ¡ (®; U (¿)) it is necessary and su¢cient that neither signatory nor nonsignatory countries prefer to deviate. If a signatory country deviates, it loses ® i and it saves on enforcement costs, but its bene…ts of procurement and monitoring costs in the continuation game are una¤ected. For a signatory country not to want to deviate, we therefore need, ® i¸D EC i (n). If a nonsignatory country deviates, it receives ® j and it has increased enforcement costs, but its bene…ts of procurement and monitoring costs in the continuation game are una¤ected. For a nonsignatory country not to prefer a deviation, we therefore need, ® j < DEC j (n + 1).
The previous discussion clari…es that DEC i (n) has a prominent impact on the SPNE of ¡ (®; U (¿)) and its properties. We therefore turn to its characterization. To simplify the presentation, in the following we will consider the extension of DEC i (n) to R + . The following Lemma characterizes an important property of DEC i (n).
Lemma 4 lies at the heart of our main results and therefore deserves careful discussion. Note that Lemma 4 implies that DEC i (n) may have an increasing portion. This means that it is possible that adding one signatory country to the Convention may imply a negative externality on the current signatory countries, in the sense that it causes enforcement costs of signatory countries to increase. This may seem surprising, because it means that the participation of an additional country in a Convention may generate a negative externality. To see why this negative externality may occur, consider the case in which there are three countries. Suppose that country 1 plans to sign Convention U (1) and consider its enforcement costs when it is the only signatory and when country 2 signs as well. From Corollary 1 we know that the e¤ect of country 2 prosecuting its …rms in country 1 is bene…cial to the government of country 1.
Consider now the consequences on country 1 of country 2 prosecuting its …rm active in country 3, …rm (2; 3). By Corollary 1, country 3 …nds it optimal to respond by augmenting the probability with which any local corrupt transaction is discovered. But the increase in the monitoring probability in country 3 has two di¤erent repercussions on the probability that …rm (1; 3) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country 3. First, it creates additional deterrence. Second, it increases the probability with which a corrupt transaction is discovered. The …rst e¤ect tends to decrease the probability that …rm (1; 3) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country 3, because it decreases the probability that bribing occurs. The second e¤ect tends to increase the probability that …rm (1; 3) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country 3, because it increases the probability with which bribing is discovered if it occurs.
Given that the two e¤ects have di¤erent signs, the net e¤ect on the probability that …rm (1; 3) is found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country 3 may be to decrease or increase it. Because the enforcement costs are increasing in this probability, country 1's enforcement costs may increase or decrease when country 2 signs the Convention. Note that the e¤ect discussed above arises only if there are at least 3 countries and this is the reason why we chose to consider a case with N countries rather than a simpler model with only 2 countries.
We now want to investigate when the gains from deviating and not signing a convention that derive from the savings in enforcement costs are maximal. We de…ne º = argmax DEC i (n) : Notice that º is not necessarily a singleton because DEC i (n) is a concave quadratic function in n and therefore there may be two values of n 2 f1; : : : ; Ng that attain the maximum. Consider now a pro…le in which n countries sign Convention U (1) at stage 0. If a signatory country deviates from such a pro…le, its enforcement cost savings are maximal when n 2 º: Given that º characterizes the action pro…les at stage 0 from which an individual deviation generates the largest enforcement cost savings, it will prove useful to discuss the incentives individual governments have to deviate from a given action pro…le at stage 0.
Equilibria with Convention U (1)
Under Convention U (1) a signatory country commits to penalizing its …rms found to have bribed the public o¢cials of all foreign countries and regardless of the number of other countries signing the Convention. Convention U (1) di¤ers from the OECD Convention but it constitutes a useful benchmark and a useful reference to discuss Conventions U (¿), ¿ > 1, that will be analyzed in the next subsection. The next Proposition characterizes SPNE under Convention U (1).
Proposition 3 Consider ¡ (®; U (1)).
A SPNE of ¡ (®; U (1)) always exists.
2. There may be at most one SPNE with min º or fewer signatory countries.
3. There may be multiple SPNE with min º + 1 or more signatory countries.
Proposition 3 says that in the case in which an individual country's enforcement cost savings DEC i (n) monotonically increase with n (i.e., when min º = N), a unique SPNE exists. To see this suppose that two SPNE exist, the …rst with N 0 and the second with N 00 > N 0 signatory countries. Because of the symmetry of the model, in the …rst SPNE the N 0 countries with the highest ®'s sign the Convention, and all the other countries do not. By the same argument, in the second SPNE the N 00 countries with the highest ®'s sign the Convention, and all the other countries do not. This means that countries i = N 0 + 1; : : : ; N 00 sign the Convention in the …rst SPNE but not in the second. Noting that the the enforcement cost savings are larger in the second SPNE than in the …rst, leads to a contradiction.
When a signatory country's reduction in enforcement costs deriving from deviating and not signing, DEC i (n), monotonically decrease with n (i.e., when min º = 1), the previous argument cannot be applied. When DEC i (n) monotonically decreases with n, instead, the fact that an additional country signs Convention U (1) reduces the excess enforcement costs that any country has to bear for signing the Convention. This generates a strategic complementarity and leads to emergence of multiple SPNE.
When a signatory country's enforcement cost savings from deviating, DEC i (n), are not monotonic in n (i.e., when 1 < min º < N), by Lemma 4, DEC i (n) is increasing for n · min º and decreasing for n¸min º + 1. By Proposition 3, the arguments used in the previous cases can be applied separately to the increasing and the decreasing portion of DEC i (n). This implies that there can be no more than one SPNE in the increasing portion of DEC i (n), but there may be multiple SPNE in the decreasing portion.
The following Proposition states that SPNE with larger numbers of signatory countries Pareto dominate SPNE with a lower number of signatory countries.
Proposition 4
Suppose that ¡ (®; U (1)) has two SPNE, one with N 0 and one with N 00 > N 0 signatory countries. Then the SPNE with N 00 Pareto dominates the SPNE with N 0 signatory countries.
Rather than providing a formal proof of Proposition 4 in the following we provide its intuition. First, notice that all countries that do not sign in either SPNE are strictly better o¤ in the second SPNE than in the …rst, because they do not bear any enforcement costs and because the bene…ts of procurement they enjoy are larger when a larger number of countries sign the Convention. Second, countries that sign the convention in the second equilibrium (with N 00 signatory countries) but not in the …rst (with N 0 signatory countries), receive a higher utility in the second equilibrium than in the …rst. To see why this is the case, notice that if such a country were to deviate from a pro…le with N 00 signatory countries, it would get higher utility than in the SPNE with N 0 signatory countries, because its bene…ts of procurement would be higher than in that case. 12 Given that the utility in the SPNE has to be at least as large as the utility from any deviation, the result follows. Finally, turn to countries that sign the Convention in both SPNE. Given that additional countries with lower idiosyncratic utilities sign the Convention in the second SPNE, the enforcement costs in the second SPNE are smaller. Noticing that the bene…ts of procurement are higher in the equilibrium with more signatory countries concludes the argument.
Equilibria Under the OECD Convention
We now turn to a characterization of SPNE under Conventions U (¿), ¿ > 1. This analysis is useful for two reasons. First, Convention U (¿), ¿ > 1, gives a stylized description of the OECD Convention (which includes a clause requiring that a minimum number of countries, representing a minimum percentage of OECD export sign it before it enters into force) and therefore provides a framework to think about the OECD Convention's likely impact. Second, a comparison of SPNE under Convention U (1) and under Conventions U (¿), ¿ > 1, makes it possible to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of introducing a minimum threshold ¿ > 1.
Notice …rst that the equivalents of Propositions 3 and 4 hold for ¡ (®; U (¿)). In other words ¡ (®; U (¿)) always has a SPNE, it may have multiple SPNE, and in case of SPNE multiplicity, SPNE with a higher number of signatory countries Pareto dominate SPNE with a lower number of signatory countries. The proofs are straightforward extensions of the previous results and are, therefore, omitted.
We now want to make comparisons between SPNE under Conventions U (1), and U (¿), ¿ > 1. For this purpose we …nd it useful to de…ne the following set of idiosyncratic utilities
there exists a SPNE of ¡ (®; U (¿)) with at least n signatory countries ª :
Proposition 5 Consider ¡ (®; U (1)) and ¡ (®; U (¿)) for ¿ > 1.
A (U (1) ; ¿) ½ A (U (¿)
; ¿) and, for ¿ < n, A (U (1) ; n) = A (U (¿) ; n).
A (U (1) ; 1) nA (U (¿) ; ¿) 6 = ?:
Proof. Appendix. Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 5 reveal that introducing a threshold ¿ > 1 may have an upside and a downside, respectively. Part 1 states …rst that there exist vectors of idiosyncratic utilities such that ¡ (®; U (¿)) has a SPNE with at least ¿ signatory countries and such that ¡ (®; U (1)) has no such SPNE. This is true because under Convention U (¿) a signatory country's deviation from a pro…le with ¿ signatory countries leads to a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement, because each of the ¿ 1 2 This is true so long as N 00 > N 0 + 1, a condition that is easily shown to hold.
signatory countries is pivotal to the Convention entering into force. Given that this loss does not occur under Convention U (1), the incentives to deviate under Convention U (¿) are fewer than under Convention U (1) and the result follows. 13 Part 1 also states that the set of idiosyncratic utilities such that there exists a SPNE with at least n signatory countries is the same under Convention U (1) as under Convention U (¿), if the threshold is strictly lower than n. This means that all SPNE with n signatory countries under Convention U (1) are also SPNE when a threshold ¿ < n is introduced. In other words, the introduction of a threshold ¿ < n does not make a SPNE with n signatory countries more likely in the sense that the sets of idiosyncratic utilities which guarantee that such a SPNE exists under the two Conventions are identical.
Summarizing, part 1 says that the introduction of a threshold ¿ is bene…cial to support a SPNE with exactly ¿ signatory countries, but is otherwise useless.
Part 2 states that there are ®'s that are such that a SPNE with a positive number of signatory countries exists under U (1) and also such that under U (¿) there is no SPNE in which the Convention enters into force. This means that there are values of ® for which the introduction of a minimum threshold leads from a convention entering into force with a possibly limited but positive number of signatory countries to a convention that does not enter into force. Notice also that the same result can be shown to apply to the comparison of SPNE under two di¤erent thresholds, ¿ 0 and ¿ 00 , with 1 · ¿ 0 < ¿ 00 · N. In other words, increasing the threshold is always risky in that it may lead to the convention not entering into force.
Our interpretation of Proposition 5 is that introducing a minimum threshold that has to be met before a Convention enters into force is a sensible requirement that may turn out to be harmful when it is set in ignorance of possible idiosyncratic components of individual countries' inclinations to sign a convention against bribery in international business transactions. In particular, a threshold is useful when it makes every signatory country pivotal. But setting an ambitiously high threshold may lead to a situation in which there is no SPNE in which the Convention enters into force.
An Alternative Convention: The Impact of Reciprocity
Convention R proposes an alternative institutional design to combat corruption in international business transactions.
Definition 4 Convention R:
If a country signs the Convention , the country commits to impose the same penalty on all domestically incorporated …rms found to have bribed public o¢cials of all other signatory countries.
Compared to the unilateral conventions analyzed in the previous section, Convention R makes use of the possibility of excluding countries from the bene…cial e¤ects of the international …ght against bribing of foreign public o¢cials, unless they actively contribute to this …ght. Under Convention U (¿), if country i decides not to sign, it loses idiosyncratic utility ® i and it saves on enforcement costs. When n = ¿, moreover, a deviation also leads to the loss deriving from the reduction in the bene…ts of procurement. Under Convention R, if country i decides not to sign, there are two important novel e¤ects. First, if country i does not sign Convention R, it saves on enforcement costs, but the savings are smaller than under Convention U (¿), in the event in which not all foreign countries sign the Convention. This derives from the fact that Convention R requires penalizing bribing of public o¢cials of signatory countries only. Given that this leads to lower enforcement costs, the savings deriving from not signing are smaller. Second, if country i decides not to sign Convention R, it loses the bene…cial e¤ects deriving from signatory countries' commitment to penalize their own …rms operating in country i, because this penalization is conditional on country i also signing the Convention. As was stated in Corollary 1 the utility of the government of country i is increasing in the sum of penalties imposed by foreign countries on their …rms operating in country i, @G i =@¼ F i > 0.
The previous discussion clari…es that Convention R provides the governments of individual countries additional incentives to sign when they believe that not all countries are likely to sign. This is because Convention R creates a direct bene…cial e¤ect of signing and it reduces the cost savings from not signing when less than full participation is expected, i.e., in the cases in which signing the Convention is likely to generate high costs and reduced bene…ts.
In the following we analyze the consequences on governments' behavior of the incentives created by Convention R: We start by studying SPNE in ¡ (0; R), the game in which individual governments simultaneously decide whether to sign Convention R at stage 0 and in which their idiosyncratic utilities they receive from signing the agreement are identically zero, ® = 0.
Proposition 6
In ¡ (0; R) there is a unique SPNE in which all N countries sign Convention R at stage 0.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2 and is therefore omitted.
Before turning to the analysis of Convention R when individual countries have idiosyncratic utilities, it is useful to discuss Proposition 6 and in particular to compare it to Proposition 2. Proposition 6 states that ¡ (0; R) has a unique SPNE in which all countries sign Convention R. In a similar way, Proposition 2 established that ¡ (0; U (N)) has a unique SPNE in which all countries sign Convention U (N). This implies that the equilibrium payo¤s under the two Conventions are identical. But we want to highlight that there is a sense in which the results of the two Propositions may be regarded as di¤erent and, in particular, that the disposition of countries to participate in the …ght against international corruption is more robust under Convention R than under Convention U (N).
Notice that in both cases cooperation is achieved by making sure that each country i receives the bene…t deriving from the fact that the other countries will prosecute their …rms found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country i only if country i itself signs the Convention. Under Convention U (N ) this is achieved by making each country pivotal to the Convention entering into force. Under Convention R this is achieved by conditioning a country's bene…ts to its participation in the Convention. Notice, however, that under Convention U (N) if, for some reason, it is believed that at least one country will not sign the Convention, then all countries are indi¤erent between signing or not. Under Convention R the situation is radically di¤erent, because, so long as a country believes that at least one other country signs the Convention, it …nds it strictly pro…table to sign the Convention as well.
We now turn to a characterization of SPNE under Convention R when individual countries have idiosyncratic components in their payo¤ functions. Notice …rst that the results of Propositions 3 and 4 extend to ¡ (®; R). In other words, ¡ (®; R) always has a SPNE, it may have multiple SPNE, and in case of SPNE multiplicity, SPNE with a higher number of signatory countries Pareto dominate SPNE with a lower number of signatory countries. The proofs are straightforward extensions of Propositions 3 and 4 and are, therefore, omitted.
To make comparisons between SPNE under Conventions U (¿) and R we de…ne the following set:
there exists a SPNE of ¡ (®; R) with at least n signatory countries ª :
Proposition 7 Consider ¡ (®; U (¿)) and ¡ (®; R).
A (U (¿)
; n) ½ A (R; n) for ¿ · n and ¿ < N:
Proof. Appendix. Part 1 of Proposition 7 states that there exist vectors of idiosyncratic utilities such that ¡ (®; R) has a SPNE with at least ¿ < N signatory countries and such that ¡ (®; U (¿)) has no such SPNE, while the reverse is impossible. To see why this is true, consider the case in which ¡ (®; U (¿)) admits a SPNE with exactly ¿ signatory countries. 14 When a signatory country deviates from such a pro…le it loses its idiosyncratic payo¤ ® i , it saves on the enforcement costs, but it will also cause the Convention not entering into force and will therefore bear an additional loss deriving from the reduction in the bene…ts of procurement. Consider the same pro…le under Convention R and consider a deviation of a signatory country. The deviator loses its idiosyncratic payo¤ ® i , it saves on the enforcement costs and it also bears the loss deriving from the reduction in the bene…ts of procurement. The …rst and the third element are identical under Convention U (¿) as under Convention R. But the enforcement cost savings are smaller when deviating under Convention R, because Convention R only requires prosecuting the …rms bribing the public o¢cials of the other signatory countries, which, in the case contemplated in Part 1, are less than the total number of countries, N. This means that the incentives to deviate from a pro…le with ¿ < N signatory countries are fewer under Convention R than under Convention U (¿), and the result follows.
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Part 2 states that set of idiosyncratic utilities such that there exists a SPNE with N signatory countries is the same under Convention U (N) as under Convention R. The reason for this is that with ¿ = N , the reduction of the bene…ts of procurement to a country that deviates from a pro…le in which N countries sign the convention is the same under U (¿) or under R. Notice that from Proposition 2, 0 2 A (U (N) ; N) and from Proposition 6, 0 2 A (R; N ). Part 2 generalizes this result by showing that the set of idiosyncratic utilities that lead to a SPNE with N signatory countries are the same under U (N) and R.
Our interpretation of the previous results is that there are two reasons why Convention R may be preferred to Convention U (¿). The …rst is clari…ed by part 1 of Proposition 7 that suggests that a reciprocal convention is more likely to bring countries together in the …ght against international corruption than a unilateral convention, because SPNE with any given number of signatory countries arise with a larger set of parameter constellations in the former than in the latter case. To see the second reason, notice that part 2 of Proposition 7 does not say that if ¿ is set high enough a unilateral Convention leads to the same result as a reciprocal convention. The reason is that part 2 of Proposition 7 does not say that when ® = 2 A (U (N ) ; N) = A (R; N) the set of SPNE under U (N) or under R are the same. In fact, under U (N) the Convention will not enter into force in any SPNE, but it is possible that a SPNE in which a positive number of countries signing Convention R exists.
In other words, our discussion above clari…es that there are reasons to believe that a unilateral convention is risky because it may lead to no results in the …ght against international corruption, especially when the convention sets ambitious goals through a high threshold. By contrast, a reciprocal convention creates more incentives to participate in the …ght against international corruption and at the same time allows individual countries to gauge their ambitions through their equilibrium play.
Discussion
This paper proposes a simple theoretical framework to study the enforcement of penalties for bribing foreign public o¢cials. The participation of foreign …rms is commonly believed to promote competition and e¢ciency, but corruption in international business transactions is facilitated by the fact that it is often very di¢cult or very costly to enforce penalties on foreign …rms and nationals. We analyze the ways in which international conventions may help resolve this problem by requiring signatory countries to penalize their …rms that are found to have bribed foreign public o¢cials.
We …rst study the incentives to sign international conventions styled along the lines of the OECD's "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public O¢cials in International Business Transactions." In this type of convention a signatory country commits to unilaterally penalize its …rms that are found to have bribed public o¢cials of any foreign countries, regardless of whether these countries reciprocate or not. We …nd that this type of convention may succeed in fostering some degree of international cooperation in …ghting corruption, but that it may lead to no advances when it sets goals which are too ambitious.
We then analyze a di¤erent type of convention that includes a reciprocity clause which speci…es that a signatory country commits to penalizing its …rms that are found to have bribed public o¢cials of foreign signatory countries, i.e., only of reciprocating countries. We show that this has two important e¤ects. First, it reduces the enforcement costs deriving from signing the convention when not all countries sign the convention. Second, it implies a loss for a country that decides not to sign, because the advantages deriving from the fact that the foreign …rms operating in the country are subject to corruption penalties accrue only if the country signs the convention. We show that the ultimate consequences of these e¤ects are that a convention with a reciprocity provision is more conducive to international cooperation and may therefore lead to substantial gains in terms of reducing corruption in international business transactions.
For ease of exposition our results are derived for the case in which the probability of a …rm succeeding in bribing a public o¢cial depends on the bribe it bids, but is independent of the bribes bid by its competitors. Our results do not depend on this assumption, but can be obtained for a more general model in which the probability of any one …rm succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial depends negatively on the bribes bid by its competitors.
Our analysis is an initial step towards the understanding of international conventions to combat corruption and it therefore relies on a simple model. We believe that future research may lead to advances in two di¤erent directions. First, our model is silent about various additional e¤ects of di¤erent types of conventions. Because of its reduced risk, for instance, signing Convention R is likely to be perceived as a politically compelling option. By this, we mean that a government not willing to confront corruption may …nd it easy to argue that a unilateral convention is likely to generate high costs and very limited bene…ts, but that this argument is much less persuasive when waged against a reciprocal convention. Because compliance with a reciprocal convention entitles a country to enjoy its bene…ts, a reciprocal convention, moreover, is also more likely to be accompanied by an e¤ective surveillance system. For the same reason, however, it should not come as a surprise if an inspector from a given country had perverse motives in defending that another country is not complying with the convention. Second, our model has made two important assumptions. The …rst is to deal with a symmetric environment in which, other things being equal, …rms from any country have the same probability of selling in any other country. This ignores the fact that the patterns of international trade also establish a pattern of corruption trade and leads to a symmetric convention in which all countries play the same role. A more realistic model would recognize asymmetries and is likely to prescribe di¤erent behaviors on the part of corruption importers and exporters. 16 The second is that we have dealt with a complete information environment in which all countries know their payo¤ functions and in particular their idiosyncratic inclinations to sign conventions. A more realistic environment would allow for incomplete information and for the possibility that countries' inclinations to combat corruption are correlated.
Future research dealing with some of the issues mentioned above is likely to generate substantial progress in our understanding of policies designed to curb corruption in international business transactions.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Firm (i; j)'s maximization problem is
The …rst order condition is
Given that the second order condition is satis…ed (because ¡2=B < 0), the Lemma follows.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1, the probability of corruption in country i is°i
Given this, the problem for the government of country i in stage 2 is
From (7) and (8) this problem is equivalent to
The …rst order condition for an interior solution is
Assuming that the second order condition is satis…ed,
we obtain
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that by Lemma 2, P N j=1 ¼ ji¸¼ for j = 1; : : : ; N implies that ¹ j > 0, j = 1; : : : ; N. Simple inspection of the objective function of the government of country i = 1; : : : ; N, implies that in a SPNE ¼ ij = 0 for i = 1; : : : ; N and j 6 = i. We now want to show that (5) is su¢cient to guarantee that in a SPNE ¼ ii = ¼ for i = 1; : : : ; N . To see this, consider ¼ 00 and ¼ 0 that di¤er only in that
for an arbitrary value of ¹ i and for°i and°i j given by (8) and (9)
with the …rst inequality following from (5) . Notice that the previous inequality implies that
a condition which is satis…ed by Lemma 2. This in turn means that under (5) in a SPNE of ¡, the government of each country i will penalize the domestic …rm that operates in the country. Summarizing, we get
The rest of the results stated in Proposition 1 follow by straightforward substitutions.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
Di¤erentiating (10) with respect to ¼ Fi we obtain
with the inequality following from that fact that the second order condition for the government's problem ensures that the denominator is positive. Rewrite corruption in country i as°i
Di¤erentiating with respect to ¼ F i we obtain
Consider now government i's best response to a given ¼ iF . To show that @G i =@¼ iF > 0, it is su¢cient to observe that when ¼ iF is increased, government i's utility is higher even if its play is unchanged.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Since we assume that whenever indi¤erent between signing or not, a country signs the Convention, it is immediate to recognize that there is a unique SPNE with either N ¡1 or N countries signing the agreement. In the following we show that the unique SPNE is for all countries to sign the agreement.
Consider an arbitrary government i and assume that all the other N ¡ 1 countries sign the Convention. We want to show that government i's best response is to sign the Convention.
The utility of the government of country i, if it signs the Convention is
The utility of the government of country i, when it does not sign the Convention is
We want to show that G S i > G N S i . Let ¹ S¤ denote the SPNE monitoring probability in a signatory country in a subgame starting after N countries sign the Convention. Let ¹ NS¤ denote the SPNE monitoring probability in a nonsignatory country in a subgame starting after N ¡ 1 countries sign the Convention. We then have
with the …rst inequality following from the fact that ¹ S¤ is the optimal monitoring probability for a signatory country and the last inequality deriving from the fact that ¹ NS¤ > 0 implies
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Recall from Lemma 3
:
Note that if N¸3, Q 2 · 0 and DEC i (n) is concave in n.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider ¡ (®; U (1)). Recall that we assume that ® 1¸: : :¸® N and that whenever indi¤erent between signing or not, a country signs the Convention. Given this a pro…le in which N 0 countries the Convention may be part of a SPNE if and only if
We …rst want to establish the existence of SPNE. If ® 1 < DEC 1 (1), there exists a SPNE in which no country signs the convention. When ® 1¸D G 1 (1), there are two cases:
1. There exists a country j such that
In this case there exists a SPNE in which only countries i = 1; : : : ; j ¡1 sign the convention 2. There exists no country j such that ® j < DEC j (j). In this case ® N¸D EC N (N ) and there exists a SPNE in which all countries sign the convention.
We now want to show that ¡ (®; U (1)) admits at most one SPNE with min º or fewer signatory countries, but multiple SPNE with min º + 1 or more signatory countries. By de…nition of º, DEC i (n) is increasing for all n · min º and decreasing for all n¸min º + 1:
Consider …rst n · min º and assume that there is a SPNE in which N 0 · min º countries sign the Convention. This implies that
But then it is impossible to have another SPNE with N 00 2 fN 0 + 1; : : : ; min ºg signatory countries because
¢ cannot be satis…ed for N 00 2 fN 0 + 1; : : : ; min ºg, given that
N 00 2 fN 0 + 1; : : : ; min ºg. Consider now n¸min º + 1. Assume that there is a SPNE in which only N 0¸m in º + 1 countries sign the Convention. This implies that
Given that DEC i (n) is decreasing for n¸min º + 1 there exists an ® 2 R N such that
for k¸2. This means that there exists an ® 2 R N such that ¡ (®; U (1)) has two SPNE, with N 0¸m in º + 1 and N 00 = N 0 + k > min º + 1 signatory countries, respectively. Notice that the condition k¸2 is necessary, because for k = 1, (14) would contradict (13).
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Part 1: Consider a SPNE with n > ¿ signatory countries. Given that deviation payo¤s for both signatory and nonsignatory countries are identical under U (1) and under U (¿), we get A (U (1) ; n) = A (U (¿) ; n).
Consider now an ® such that a SPNE with ¿ signatory countries under U (1) exists. This implies that the deviation payo¤s for all signatory countries are nonpositive. For signatory countries, i = 1; : : : ; ¿ we therefore have
Recalling that we assume that, if indi¤erent a country signs the Convention, for nonsignatory countries i = ¿ + 1; : : : ; N we have
Notice that under U (¿) the only di¤erence that arises is that a deviation for a signatory country also brings about a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement. This implies that (16) is a su¢cient condition for the deviation payo¤s to signatory countries to be negative under U (¿) and therefore that ® 2 A (U (1) ; ¿) implies that ® 2 A (U (¿) ; ¿) We now want to show that there exists ®'s that belong to A (U (¿) ; ¿) but not to A (U (1) ; ¿). Let ® ¤ 2 R N be such that country ¿ is exactly indi¤erent between deviating or not from a pro…le in which ¿ countries sign Convention U (1)
and such that the rest of the signatory countries strictly prefer to sign and nonsignatory countries prefer not to sign. Consider now ® ¤¤ 2 R N such that
Consider ± > 0 such that for all " 2 (0; ±), ® ¤¤ = 2 A (U (1) ; ¿). Given that a signatory country's deviation under U (¿) also leads to a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement, a signatory country's deviation payo¤ is lower and this implies that there exist " 2 (0; ±) such that ® ¤¤ 2 A (U (¿) ; ¿). Part 2: Consider an ® such that ® ¿¡1 is su¢ciently large and ® ¿ is su¢ciently small. Then, ® 2 A (U (1) ; 1) but ® = 2 A (U (¿) ; ¿), for all ¿ > 1.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Part 1: Consider a pro…le with ¿ signatory countries and suppose it may be part of a SPNE of U (¿). This implies that for every signatory country i = 1; : : : ; ¿, DEC i (¿) ¡ ® i has to be at least as large as the reduction of the bene…ts of procurement which takes place because a country's unilateral deviation is su¢cient for the Convention not entering into force. Consider now the same pro…le under Convention R. If a signatory country deviates from such a pro…le it will also lose ® i and will su¤er a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement., so that the deviation payo¤ is the same as with U (¿). But because, when ¿ < N, the enforcement costs under R are smaller than under U (¿), the equilibrium payo¤ under R is larger. This means that if a signatory country does not …nd it pro…table to deviate from a pro…le with ¿ signatory country under U (¿), it will also …nd it pro…table not to deviate under R. This implies that under R there exists a SPNE with either ¿ or strictly more than ¿ signatory countries.
In the case of n > ¿ signatory countries the argument is reinforced by the fact that under U (¿) a unilateral deviation leaves the bene…ts of procurement to the deviator una¤ected, whereas under R a deviation for a signatory country leads to a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement and a deviation for a nonsignatory country leads to a gain in the bene…ts of procurement.
This shows that for ¿ < N and n¸¿, ® 2 A (U (¿) ; n) implies that ® 2 A (R; n).
We now want to show that for ¿ < N and n¸¿, there exist an ® 2 R N such that ® = 2 A (U (¿) ; n) and ® 2 A (R; n).
Let ® ¤ 2 R N be such that country ¿ is exactly indi¤erent between deviating or not from a pro…le in which ¿ countries sign Convention U (¿) and such that the rest of the signatory countries strictly prefer to sign and nonsignatory countries prefer not to sign.
Consider now ® ¤¤ 2 R N such that Consider ± > 0 such that for all " 2 (0; ±), ® ¤¤ = 2 A (U (¿) ; ¿). Given that a signatory country's enforcement costs under R are lower than under U (¿), a signatory country's deviation payo¤ is lower and this implies that there exist " 2 (0; ±) such that ® ¤¤ 2 A (R; ¿). In the case of n > ¿ signatory countries, the argument is reinforced by the fact that under U (¿) a unilateral deviation leaves the bene…ts of procurement to the deviator una¤ected, whereas under R a deviation for a signatory country leads to a reduction in the bene…ts of procurement and a deviation for a nonsignatory country leads to a gain in the bene…ts of procurement.
Part 2: Consider a pro…le in which all N countries sign Convention U (N) or Convention R, respectively. Notice that the payo¤s associated with this pro…le in ¡ (®; U (N )) and ¡ (®; R) are identical and so are the deviation payo¤s. This implies that A (U (N) ; N) = A (R; N ).
B An Alternative Model of Bribing
The purpose of this appendix is to verify that the main properties of the model of bribing we have proposed hold under a di¤erent speci…cation of the probability of a …rm succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial of a given country. We consider a case in which the probability of winning the auction is increasing in its own bribe and increasing in the di¤erence between its own bribe and the average bribe. This implies the probability of succeeding in bribing the public o¢cial is decreasing in the bribes bid by competing …rms. This creates a strategic complementarity that implies that if a …rm bids a higher bribe, all its opponents also …nd it optimal to bid higher bribes. We show that the properties of the bidding game that were established in Corollary 1 hold under this new speci…cation and we therefore conclude that the analysis of international conventions would be qualitatively unchanged under this alternative speci…cation.
Assume that each …rm sets a nonnegative bribe and that the probability that a corrupt transaction takes place between …rm (i; j) (incorporated in country i and operating in country j) and the public o¢cial of country j is°i
with°i j 2 [0; 1], B > 0, an exogenous parameter that measures public o¢cials' propensity to corruption and l 2 [0; 1). Notice that°i j is increasing in¯i j and decreasing in B and¯z j , z 6 = i. Firm (i; j) is required to pay the bribe it o¤ered,¯i j , only if it wins the auction. Under this probabilistic auction a …rm that bids a higher bribe has a higher probability of corrupting the public o¢cial, but this probability is less than 1, and all …rms i that bid bribes
have a strictly positive probability to succeed in bribing the public o¢cial. When all …rms have a strictly positive probability of bribing the public o¢cial of the country in which they operate, the probability of corruption in country j is°j
In the following we will restrict attention to situations in which each …rm has a strictly positive probability of bribing the public o¢cial of the country in which it operates and in which the probability of each public o¢cial being bribed is strictly less than 1, i.e., to cases in which, for all j N X i=1¯i j < B
We now want to characterize the bribes in the equilibrium of the subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 3, i.e., after governments have set penalties and monitoring probabilities. In particular, we want to characterize how equilibrium bids and the resulting probabilities of corruption depend on monitoring probabilities and penalties. In other words, we want to perform the same comparative statics exercises that were performed in Corollary 1 and that lie at the heart of the results of the paper.
Given that the model in the paper corresponds to the case in which l = 0, in the following we will focus on the case l 2 (0; 1). We …nd it convenient to divide the previous expression by l and let h = (1 + l) =l. Notice that l 2 (0; 1) implies h > 2. Firm (i; j)'s maximization problem can then be rewritten as
The solution of (19) is characterized by the …rst order condition
Notice that because the …rst order condition is linear in the bribes, an equilibrium of the bribe setting game of stage 3 has to be symmetric, i.e., such that all …rms that are penalized by their home country if found to have bribed the public o¢cial of country j, bid¯P j and all remaining …rms (who are not penalized) bid¯N Pj . We denote by n j the number of countries that penalize their …rms active in country j. We obtain
From (20) and (21) we obtain
From (22) and (23) one can see that the equilibrium bribes are decreasing in ¹ j , ¼ and n j . From (22) and (23) we can also compute the expected corruption of individual …rms when they are penalized for corruption,°P j ¡ ¹ j ; n j ¢ , and when they are not,°N Pj ¡ ¹ j ; n j ¢ . Straightforward calculations show that°P
and that°P j ¡ ¹ j ; n j ¢ is increasing in n j . The probability of corruption in country j can then shown to be equal to°j
2hN ¡1 n j ¹ j ¼ B and is therefore decreasing in n j .
We now want to analyze when an increase in n j causes the government of country j to increase its monitoring intensity. In other words we want to verify under what conditions @¹ j @n j > 0 in a subgame of ¡ starting at stage 2. In particular we want to investigate how monitoring probabilities depend on n j . Notice that because the monitoring probability set by country j in stage 2 is independent of the probabilities set by the other countries, each government has a dominant strategy in stage 2. We make use of the following result of Edlin and Shannon (1998), 18 which allows us to obtain strictly monotonic comparative statics results for interior solutions without making further assumptions on the concavity of problem.
Theorem 8 (Edlin and Shannon, 1998) Let S ½ <; f : < £ < ! <; y ¤ 2 argmax y2S f (y; t ¤ ) and y 0 2 argmax y2S f (y; t 0 ): Suppose that f is C 1 and has increasing marginal returns, and that y ¤ 2 intS . Then y 0 > y ¤ if t 0 > t ¤ , and y 0 < y ¤ if t 0 < t ¤ :
The problem that characterizes the stage 2 best response of the government of country j can be written as In other words, when condition (26) holds, from Theorem 8, ¹ j , the monitoring probability set by country j in stage 2 is increasing in n j , the number of countries which in stage 1 set a penalty for their …rm active in country j. Recalling that
we can conclude that
This implies that a su¢cient condition for (26) to hold is that
which can be veri…ed to hold for h > 2. From (27) it is easy to recognize that corruption in country j is decreasing in n j ,
It is also possible to show that when n j increases the equilibrium utility of country j increases. To see this, it is su¢cient to show that country j's utility increases even if it does not modify ¹ j , or, equivalently, that f is increasing in n j . Straightforward calculations show that this holds whenever
and that (27) implies (28).
